Korea falls in love with NATO – EURACTIV.com
Korea’s recent opening of a mission to NATO is a clear sign that the Asian country is here to stay, as the defence alliance becomes an important component of Seoul’s future security strategy, writes Ramon Pacheco Pardo.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo is the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance and Professor of International Relations at King’s College London.
From government officials to think tankers, Koreans want to know why NATO sees their country as a partner and what can Korea offer in return.
Even more interestingly for those seating in NATO’s Leopold III headquarters, Korea’s love affair with NATO is not a summer fling. It’s part of a long-lasting and well-calibrated courtship.
Korea’s recent opening of a mission to NATO is none other than the clearest sign that the Asian country is here to stay.
Certainly, there are immediate reasons why the Korean government sees the need to deepen ties with NATO. Above all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine looms large in Seoul. Not only is the invasion against international law, but it could set a dangerous precedent as tensions between China and Taiwan rise.
Thus, Korea has become the only Asian country to condemn Russia’s actions, impose sanctions on Moscow and also send offensive weapons to Ukraine—via third parties.
In private, Korean policy-makers don’t deny that Korean military equipment can be used by Ukrainian forces, even if Moscow has warned Seoul not to sell weapons to NATO members that can then transfer them to Ukraine.
There is a reason why Russian leader Vladimir Putin recently warned South Korea not to (directly) transfer weapons to Ukraine. But it is already too late.
Yet, South Korea’s rapprochement towards NATO has more enduring, longer-term reasons behind it.
To start with, the Korea-US alliance is now global in nature. This is a process that started at the end of the Cold War, and that has become very clear over the past fifteen years.
Since the US continues to be the most important NATO ally and is pressing for the organisation to engage with its four core Asia-Pacific partners, it is only natural for Korea to deepen ties with it. Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea’s president, had no doubts about whether to attend the Madrid NATO summit upon taking office last May.
But US president Joe Biden reminded him about the importance of his attendance for good measure.
Furthermore, and at least as relevant, Korea has been increasing security ties with NATO members such as Canada, Estonia, France, Norway, Poland and the UK in recent years.
These growing ties are partly linked to Korea looking for reliable partners to better manage US-China competition and partly linked to Korea seeking like-minded partners to address the growing threats coming from North Korea and China. In fact, the latter is becoming ever more important for Seoul.
As a case in point, the previous Korean government led by Moon Jae-in joined NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre to help guard against cyber attacks from these two countries. The Yoon government wants to double down on this policy.
It should be noted that from the current government’s perspective, there is no contradiction in strengthening ties with NATO, individual European and NATO countries and the EU at the same time.
This is not a zero-sum game.
Therefore, from a Korean perspective boosting security ties with NATO has the added advantage of deepening links with individual European countries plus the EU.
Another long-term driver behind Korea’s rapprochement towards NATO is values, and being able to work with like-minded countries. Yoon has constantly emphasised their importance in Korea’s foreign policy.
In recent weeks, Seoul has voted in favour of an investigation of China’s actions in Xinjiang at the UN Human Rights Committee; co-sponsored a North Korea human rights resolution at the UN General Assembly for the first time since 2018; and voted to condemn Russia’s attempt to annex Ukrainian territories, again at the General Assembly.
The new Korean government has also appointed a North Korea human rights envoy, a position that had been vacant since 2018. From Yoon’s perspective, paying more attention to values as part of Korean foreign policy calls for deeper ties with NATO.
After all, Seoul feels that Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow are three sides of the same coin, so to speak.
Dating back to China’s decision to impose sanctions on Korea after the latter agreed to the deployment of Washington’s THAAD anti-missile system, Korea has been under no illusion that its neighbour won’t flex its muscle when it sees fit.
Incursions in Korea’s ADIZ and even airspace by combined Sino-Russian forces has brought home the growing military cooperation between the two. And North Korea’s UN votes in support of Russia and criticism of NATO following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine make the Kim Jong-un regime one of the very few governments openly siding with Putin.
NATO may not be the key for Korea to address this trilateral cooperation. But it is part of the answer that the Yoon government seeks.
All in all, Korea believes that NATO will become an important component of its future security strategy. Its love affair with the organisation is here to stay.